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Structured Abstract:  
  
Purpose –The DPRK has maintained an extensive array of foreign relationships over 
the past decades, both for political and economic gains. This article evaluates the 
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impact of the current sanction regime on the DPRK’s activities with African 
countries. 
Design/Methodology/Approach/ - The analysis is conducted by using a bespoke 
behavior framework based Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ theory. This framework 
develops the concepts of balancing, defensive bandwagoning and opportunistic 
bandwagoning as potential behaviors for African states following the imposition of 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions to sanction the North Korean state from 
2006 until 2017.  
Findings – Evidence suggest that long-standing relationships based on military and 
economic cooperation have mostly been severed in recent years, thus supporting a 
general balancing behavior. Findings also suggest that a specific group of countries 
subscribe to new opportunistic and defensive bandwagoning by embarking on talks 
and partnerships in the fields of health and science, regardless of the sanction regime, 
and thus in known defiance of a Western-led world order.  
Practical Implications – The current rapprochement between North and South Korea 
on one hand and North Korea and the United States on the other hand, has large 
implications for the potential removal of UNSCRs that paralyze North Korean foreign 
relations and slow down its potential development. A clearer understanding of the 
DPRK’s economic and market networks abroad, as well as potential political allies 
can help differentiate between legitimate activities and illegal ones, thus allowing for 
a more informed approach to engaging with the DPRK.  
Originality/Value – The article looks at DPRK relationships that have often been 
ignored because they were not seen as important given that North Korea was never 
expected to be successful in developing advanced military and nuclear technology. It 
is original as it looks at declassified official documents, official economic and 
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military trade records and news archives, and presents an encompassing analysis of 51 
African countries’ relations with the DPRK over time. The results of the study are 
valuable as they add to the understanding of the DPRK’s foreign policy behavior, 
which is important given its potential nuclear status.  
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Introduction 
 
 In 2017, Pyongyang was undoubtedly an important focus in the international 
arena: with no less than 11 missile launches and a 6th nuclear test, a range of new 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions further restricted the DPRK’s economic 
and military relations. Sanctions that focused on limiting light weapons spread and 
financial transactions to and from Pyongyang were also complemented by the United 
States’ own unilateral sanctions and travel ban. For the first time, sanctions also 
focused on otherwise neglected aspects of the DPRK’s trading networks and revenue 
schemes, including a large number of legal ventures. As a result, Pyongyang’s 
overseas workers were heavily targeted, and so were North Korean firms operating 
abroad, including Mansudae Art Studio and Mansudae Overseas Projects which had 
built statues and monuments throughout Africa and parts of Asia since the 1980s.   
 
Thus, after more than fifty years of military and economic cooperation with North 
Korea, Uganda announced it would severe its relationship with the DPRK in October 
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2017.1 The cooperation had expanded to many sectors, but its flagship pattern 
involved Pyongyang supplying military advisors and weapons in exchange for 
Kampala’s economic support and agricultural products. Personal relationships also 
ran deep, with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, always 
placing a good word in for the Korean ‘friends who has helped Uganda over time.’2  
 
Uganda’s attitude toward the sanctions, and its decision to ultimately sever its ties 
with the DPRK highlights the dilemma that a number of countries also involved with 
Pyongyang have to contend with. Since its creation in 1948, the DPRK has been 
engaged with a large amount of countries around the world and especially in Africa, 
and has conducted an extended foreign policy enterprise during the Cold War to 
secure relationships around the world to counterbalance the Republic of Korea’s own 
efforts at being seen as the ‘legitimate’ Korea. Some of these countries have become 
export grounds for North Korean military equipment, some have become fertile 
partners in agricultural exchanges, and some have become smuggling opportunities 
for gold and rhino horns.  
 
Exploring the extent of African engagement with the DPRK is as equally original as it 
is crucial as it remains a relatively little-analyzed avenue in North Korean studies than 
traditional partnerships and relationships the DPRK might have developed with 
Russia or China for example. Yet, crucial questions abound. Do we see an 
abandonment and isolation of the DPRK? Are countries paying lip-service to the 
                                               
1 Daily Monitor, “Painful Divorce as Uganda Ends 50-Year Military Cooperation with North 
Korea,” December 4, 2017.  
2 Associated Press International, “Uganda Expels North Korea Military Experts over UN 
Sanctions,” October 20, 2017.  
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sanction regime? For what reasons? More importantly, is there a shift in DPRK 
relationships from countries it used to engage with and whose well-documented 
engagement history has led to more scrutiny from the international community to 
countries that have not been seen as traditionally engaged with the DPRK, but are 
joining the bandwagon because of perceived interests, be they economic or political?  
In order to investigate the potentially significant changing relationship between the 51 
countries that form the African continent and the DPRK, the article proceeds in four 
steps. First, it lays out the DPRK and its Africa pursuit in its historical context. 
Second, it analyses the DPRK’s engagement via the prism of benevolent and 
economic diplomacy. Third, it presents a concise theoretical discussion of the DPRK 
sanction regime and rigorous hypotheses regarding the potential decisions to 
bandwagon with the international community in its efforts to balance against 
Pyongyang, or bandwagon with the DPRK to balance against external pressures in an 
effort to salvage needed political, trade and security links. Fourth, it evaluates which 
countries and sectors have mostly been affected by United Nations Security Council 
Resolution by considering balancing, defensive bandwagoning and opportunistic 
bandwagoning as the three main patterns developing in the Kim Jong Un era.  
 
I. Developing DPRK-Africa relations 
  
 a. Relating with the Third World 
 
 The DPRK was, upon its establishment as an independent republic on 
September 9, 1948, already in contention for its very survival and legitimacy. The 
presence of the Republic of Korea and the support it received from the United States 
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led to a situation whereby both Koreas had to attempt to establish themselves as the 
sole Korea to the rest of the world. The situation was amplified by the Korean War 
and the absence of a peace settlement, by geopolitical forces during the Cold War that 
pitted both Koreans on either sides of a diplomatic fence, and because of policies that 
the Koreas themselves had developed. In particular, both Koreas insisted for the better 
part of three decades that a country would not be able to have relationship with both 
Koreas and therefore had to choose to engage with either one, or with the other. What 
this meant was that both Koreas competed fiercely with one another to secure 
relationships in parts of Asia and Africa, in order to project image and influence 
(Armstrong 2013). This policy was finding good resonance around the developing 
world and as a young, newly-independent country freed of Japanese colonialism, the 
DPRK was unencumbered by its past. Indeed, there was no talk of the Kim regime 
being a dictatorship and no worry about militarization yet. What was particularly 
important to a number of newly-decolonized countries was the DPRK’s commitment 
to independence: thus, the DPRK shared many similarities with other countries that 
sought recognition as independent states (Young 2015).  
 
Apart from its decolonized identity, the DPRK had a number of interesting assets it 
could flaunt to attract other newly-independent countries into its orbit. For one, it had 
solid economic performances thanks to the Japanese modernization and investments 
in infrastructure that had taken place in the northern part of the peninsula during the 
colonization. This meant that Pyongyang’s economy was growing faster than that of 
Seoul, as least in the early partition days (Ji 2001).  It was also clear that the DPRK 
was receiving economic aid from the Soviet Union, and that indirectly, the Soviet 
Union was subsidizing any assistance that the DPRK would provide to third countries 
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(Bechtol 2012). But Kim Il Sung was concerned  about Soviet influence within its 
domestic system and wanted to retain its political independence (Kim 1970). This 
provided the impetus for the evolution in 1974 of Chuch’e from a political tool 
designed to strengthen Kim Il Sung’s domestic standing by nurturing his personality 
cult to Kimilsungism, an ideology that would focus on states’ rights to national 
identity and sovereignty. But long before Kimilsungism and its focus on the domestic, 
attempts at a pseudo internationalization strategy had been made, with Pyongyang 
starting as early as the mid-1950s to support a number of independence and freedom 
movements. Indeed, Gamal Abdel Nasser received help from the DPRK during the 
1956 Suez Crisis,3 and Korean political support was also extended to the Algerian 
National Liberation Front4 while construction materials and Korean engineers 
participated in the rebuilding of Addis Ababa. 5 This internationalization strategy was 
not based on a desire to fundamentally help others, though: then, and now, North 
Korean foreign policy has always been rooted in independence, self-gain and 
nationalism (Szalontai 2005, Armstrong 2013). It managed to crystalize as such 
because of the need to compete with South Korea for diplomatic recognition as well 
as legitimation, thus leading the DPRK to develop relationships with 164 countries, 
                                               
3 “Report attached to 'Development of Relations with Socialist Countries since March 19, 
1961',” 19 March 1961, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Dossier 
08/13/07; Fond: GPRA, 1958-62; Archives Nationales d’Algérie, Alger. Translated from 
French and transcribed by Pierre Asselin, with Paulina Kostrzewski. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121589 [Last Accessed 31 May 2018]. 
4 “Report attached to 'Development of Relations with Socialist Countries since March 19, 
1961',” 19 March 1961, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Dossier 
08/13/07; Fond: GPRA, 1958-62; Archives Nationales d’Algérie, Alger. Translated from 
French and transcribed by Pierre Asselin, with Paulina Kostrzewski. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121589 [Last Accessed 31 May 2018]. 
5 “Hungarian Embassy in Ethiopia, Telegram, 25 November 1980. Subject: DPRK-Ethiopian 
relations.,” 25 November 1980, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, 
XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1980, 84. doboz, 81-10, 00884/1980. Translated for NKIDP by Balazs 
Szalontai. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115823 [Last Accessed 31 May 
2018]. 
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and to maintain more than 65 embassies aboard (Wertz, Oh, and Kim 2016). African 
countries were particularly well-suited to the DPRK’s internationalization strategy 
(Owoeye 1991) as they were located far-enough not to interfere too quickly into inter-
Korean matters. They also possessed agricultural goods and resources that Pyongyang 
did not always have. The fact that they often needed industrial products and military 
goods and services was a good match, since this is what the DPRK specialized in and 
possessed at the time.  
 
 
 b. Crafting an Africa foreign policy 
 
 The DPRK established its first diplomatic relationship with an African 
country, Guinea, in 1958. Dozens of relationships followed quickly,6 partly because 
of the DPRK’s drive to outpace the ROK at the international relationship game, and 
partly because the DPRK was in need of partners for economic commerce (see Table 
1). The bulk of partnerships was established in the 1950s and in the 1960s, when the 
DPRK still had a comparative advantage over the ROK when it came to its industrial 
capacity and outputs. Because maintaining full diplomatic missions abroad was 
onerous for a small economy like North Korea, a number of ambassadors and 
diplomatic missions covered several countries at once.  
 
Figure 1. DPRK-Africa Diplomatic Relationships 
                                               
6 “Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People’s Republic in the DPRK to the Foreign Ministry 
of Hungary,” 20 May 1960, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-
J-1-j-Korea-5/b-004817/1960 4.d. Translated by Jószef Litkei. 
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Out of 51 African countries, Egypt and Nigeria were the only two countries that 
hosted a DPRK embassy and also had their own embassy in the DPRK. The DPRK 
operated its designated embassies in 11 additional countries in Africa. Those 13 
countries have been at the core of the DPRK’s economic strategy with the African 
continent. 
 
 
Table 1. DPRK Diplomatic Relationship with African Countries 
 
Absence of Embassy and Little to No Interactions 
    
Mali 1961-08-29 Mauritius 1973-03-16 
Mauritania 1964-11-12 Liberia 1973-12-20 
Ghana 1964-12-28 Cote D’Ivoire 1974-01-09 
Burundi 1967-03-12 Guinea-Bissau 1974-03-16 
Somalia 1967-04-13 Tunisia 1975-08-03 
Zambia 1969-04-12 Sao Tome and Principles 1975-08-09 
Chad 1969-05-08 Cape Verde 1975-08-18 
Cent. Af. Rep. 1969-09-05 Comoros 1975-11-13 
Sierra Leone 1971-10-14 Seychelles 1976-06-28 
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Rwanda 1972-04-22 Lesotho 1980-07-19 
Senegal 1972-09-08 Morocco 1989-02-13 
Madagascar 1972-11-16 Djibouti 1993-06-13 
Togo 1973-01-31 Swaziland 2007-09-20 
    
Absence of Embassy but Interactions 
 
Congo (R) 1964-12-24 Botswana 1974-12-27 
Sudan 1969-06-21 Kenya 1975-05-12 
Burkina Faso 1972-11-10 Mozambique 1975-06-25 
Benin 1973-02-05 Malawi 1982-06-25 
Gambia 1973-03-02 Namibia 1990-03-22 
Niger 1973-03-02 Eritrea 1993-05-25 
Gabon 1974-01-29   
    
Presence of DPRK Embassies 
 
Algeria 1958-09-25 Ethiopia 1975-06-05 
Guinea 1958-10-08 Angola 1975-11-16 
Tanzania 1965-01-13 Congo (DR) 1975-12-15 
Equatorial Guinea 1969-01-30 Zimbabwe 1980-04-18 
Cameroon 1972-03-03 South Africa 1988-08-10 
Uganda 1972-08-02   
    
Presence of Embassies in the DPRK 
    
Libya 1974-01-23 (Closed as of 2013?)  
    
Presence of Embassies in Both Countries 
    
Egypt 1963-08-24 Nigeria  1976-05-25 
    
 
Source: Diplomatic relations original dates as listed by The National Committee on 
North Korea – Issue Brief – DPRK Diplomatic Relations, August 2015. 
 
 
The literature directly addressing the DPRK’s engagement with African countries is 
sparse, and has focused on the one hand on the rationale for the DPRK’s efforts to 
engage with African countries, and on the other hand on specific bilateral 
relationships. Jide Owoeye’s work published by Asian Survey in 1991 was the first 
bespoke piece of research solely focusing on the DPRK’s policy toward Africa, and 
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suggested that this engagement was directly proportional to the amount of clout 
Pyongyang could garner and use against Seoul (1991). More recently, Benjamin 
Young has provided a historical look at how the DPRK attempted to develop a 
narrative that would present Pyongyang as a model for recent decolonized states, and 
how it had attempted to ‘sell’ it to African nations from the 1960s onward (2015). 
Deon Geldenhuys provided a more specific look at the DPRK-South Africa 
relationship, detailing Pyongyang’s political support of the ANC fight against 
Apartheid (2005). Lyong Choi, and Il-Young Jeong focused particularly on the 
DPRK-Zimbabwe relationship which was centered on Pyongyang’s support to Robert 
Mugabe (2017). There is also a consensus amongst researchers that the original goal 
for engaging Africa was about the DPRK projecting itself in defiance of the ROK and 
support it was receiving from the United States, in order to offer a non-Western 
alternative driven by a unique ideology, Chuch’e and later Kimilsungism, to countries 
that were weary of Western influence and its economic model. This ideology was 
based on the principles offered by Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism 
that propelled the DPRK to band with those who were opposing imperialism and that 
would also offer support to them (Geldenhuys 2005). But there were limits to what 
Kimilsungism could offer, and this was well-understood by most African countries as 
well. For the DPRK, cooperation with the Third World and especially with Africa did 
not mean that countries had to adhere to its own political ideology, but just that they 
would regard the DPRK as the sole legitimate Korean government (Young 2015). 
This was in large part what Pyongyang was after: gaining recognition and legitimacy 
on the international scene in order to influence countries that benefitted from a vote at 
the United Nations, that could be sympathetic to the DPRK cause, and would signal 
the withdrawal of United States troops from the Korean peninsula. Given the number 
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of countries in Africa that were decolonized in the 1950s and the 1960s, UN 
membership increased dramatically, thus providing an opportunity for the DPRK to 
capture, by association, some of their voting power (Owoeye 1991). So, the DPRK 
sent military advisors, personnel and goods to various African countries, and the 
North Koreans were often seen, and not without good foundations, as opportunists in 
Africa, interested in economic and personal gains (Young 2015). In a number of 
cases, the DPRK was able to forge relationships that went beyond simple commerce: 
this was the case in Socialists or Marxists-focused countries such as Tanzania and 
Ghana where party-to-party links were established (Owoeye 1991). For African 
countries too, there was little mileage in following an ideology if concrete economic 
gains were not available. Hence, they prioritized an ‘eco-political orientation’ which 
could be a good fit for the DPRK’s need for relationships of convenience as well 
(Scalapino 1983).  
 
 
II. DPRK Engagement in Africa 
  
 
 The breadth of Korean activities in Africa is wide: initially, goodwill missions 
were sent to Africa develop relationships. Then, Egypt and Mauritania were sending 
cotton to Pyongyang while the DPRK was providing steel and fertilizers. It also 
helped Mali develop a ceramic facility, it helped with the production of white cement 
in Sudan, and supported Benin’s rice cultivation efforts (Owoeye 1991). Military 
support and training came later, in the mid 1970s when the DPRK itself has started to 
reproduce some of the equipment it had received during and after the Korean war 
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from China and the Soviet Union, and slowly transformed from an arm-importer to an 
arm-exporter. Thus, two clear pathways emerged: the DPRK projecting an image of 
benevolent diplomacy through soft power, and the DPRK pursuing economic 
diplomacy through contract work.  
 
Figure 2. DPRK-Africa Trade Patterns 
 
 
 a. ‘Benevolent’ Diplomacy 
 
 The early attempts to engage with African countries in the 1950s and 1960s 
were tied to Pyongyang’s pursuit of influence through the enlargement process 
happening at the United Nations. The modus operandi for Pyongyang was clear: 
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missions were dispatched to countries that had showed support for Seoul, and which 
tended initially to be former French colonies. The process then involved signing 
treaties of amity, friendship or cooperation, before formal diplomatic relationships 
were established, and actual partnership activities were developed. The DPRK also 
provided economic aid to a number of countries, but this has to be understood within 
the context of Pyongyang as a Third World country itself supporting other Third 
World states. Hence, scope and scale were limited, and focused on relatively low-cost 
projects on technical fields the DPRK had relative experience and success in, such as 
steel, cement, and irrigation projects (Owoeye 1991). On November 17, 1975, the 
United Nations adopted Western draft resolution 3390A that called for dialogue 
between North and South Korea, the continuation of the Armistice and an alternative 
arrangement to the pure dissolution of the United Nations Command on the Korean 
peninsula. It also adopted Communist draft resolution 3390B that called for the 
dissolution of the United Nations Command, the withdrawal of foreign troops from 
the peninsula as well as the replacing of the Armistice by a permanent peace treaty. 
This was a resounding success for the DPRK and was largely achieved because of its 
courtship of the Third World and especially of the African vote. While it is not 
possible to find clear evidence that support the claim that the DPRK drastically 
changed its Africa policy following this date, it is obvious that by the mid 1970s, 
North Korean endeavors in Africa had changed. For one, the DPRK’s economy was 
slowly being outpaced by that of the South, and there was little support for the 
adoption of Chuch’e around the world. The relationship the DPRK had developed 
with the PRC and the USSR was also changing because of a slow turn toward 
capitalism and global finance. Hence, studentships were offered for African youth to 
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come study in the DPRK, in exchange for diplomatic relations and trade deals (Young 
2015).  
 
 
 b. Economic Diplomacy 
  
 Profit-focused relationships have concentrated on a DPRK presence aboard 
through contract workers, and a trading relationship that has principally involved 
military equipment. The military relationship crystalized at a time when political 
turmoil was rocking a number of African countries dealing with the establishment of 
political structures in a post-colonial world. North Korea supplied a range of 
technology (see Table 2). Amongst goods supplied, we find light equipment suitable 
for guerrilla-type activities (rocket launchers), second-hand Mig-17 jet fighters to 
Madagascar and a type originally acquired during the 1950s from China (second-
hand) and the USSR, Strela missiles originally acquired from Russia in 1976 and sold 
to Uganda, and Korean-made Hwasong 6 modelled after Scud C, and sold to Libya 
(Grzelczyk 2018). 
 
 
 
Table 2. DPRK as Weapons Supplier 
 Order Delivery Order Delivered Weapon Type and Description 
Recipients       
 Congo (DR) 
1973* 1974 3 3 Fast Attack Craft Project-123/P-4 [Second-hand] 
1975* 1975 10* 10* Towed Gun M-46 130mm 
Egypt 1983* 1984 1987 145* 145* 
Self-Propelled Multiple Rocket 
Launcher 
BM-21 Grad 122mm 
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Ethiopia 2000* 2000 10* 10* Armored Personnel Carrier YW-531/Type-63 
Libya 
1979* 1980 10* 10* 
Self-Propelled Multiple Rocket 
Launcher 
BM-21 Grad 122mm 
1995 1999 5* 5* Surface-to-Surface Missile Hwasong-6/Scud Mod-C 
Madagascar 
 
1975* 1975 4 4 Fighter Aircraft Mig-17 [Second-hand] 
1978* 1979 4 4* Landing Craft Nampo 
Tanzania 1979* 1980 4 4* Landing Craft Nampo 
Uganda 
1987* 1987 10 10 
Self-Propelled Multiple Rocket 
Launcher 
BM-21 Grad 122mm 
1987* 1987 14* 14* Armored Personnel Carrier BTR-152 [Second-hand] 
1987* 1987 100* 100* Portable Surface-to-Air Missile Strela-2/SA-7 
      
* Estimated 
 
Source: Adapted from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. 
DPRK contract workers can be divided into two categories: military/security advisers, 
and construction workers. The DPRK is said to have trained more than 2,500 guerilla 
fighters in the Third World in the 1970s decade along (Young 2015). The Uganda-
DPRK is the most visible relationship, and one that covers many fronts. North 
Korea’s expertise and superior industrial capacities made Pyongyang the more 
dominant partner in many relationships, as economic cooperation also led to more 
development-oriented work. As such, North Korea invested into Uganda to 
rehabilitate copper mines that had been closed since the last 1970s,7 and assisted with 
a number of Uganda’s small hydropower stations.8 Pyongyang was also seen as more 
of a protector and a benefactor as it rescheduled Uganda’s debts in 1989 after 
                                               
7 Xinhua General Overseas Service, “Uganda to reactivate copper industry with DPRK help,” 
February 10, 1988.  
8 Africa News, “Uganda; North Korea to assist Energy sector,” June 21 2004.  
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President Museveni appealed to its socialist partners around the world. Along with a 
delayed repayment of two years North Korea supplied tractors to support the Ugandan 
agricultural sector.9 North Korea has also trained the Ugandan police force in martial 
arts since 1987, with the agreement renegotiated and extended in 2011.10 North 
Korean builders have built police force accommodations in Uganda,11 but most of 
North Korean foreign constructions have involved its artistic studio Mansudae. 
Mansudae is an umbrella company that was founded in 1959 and that hosts painters, 
sculptors, craftsmen and technicians. Mansudae has specialized in commemorative 
monuments and statues, from the early 1980s until nowadays (See Table 3). As many 
African countries were decolonized in the 1950s and 1960s (33 of Sub-Sahara’s 
Africa’s 49 states gained independence between 1958 and 1968), they contracted with 
Mansudae to receive speedily-build, relatively cheap monuments and statues. As seen 
earlier, Mansudae’s overseas future is now constrained by UN sanctions that prohibit 
both North Korean workers abroad, and North Korea exporting monuments and 
statues.  
 
 
Table 3. DPRK Mansudae Overseas Constructions in Africa 
Country Monument Name Completion Year 
Cost 
(Million 
US$)* 
Angola 
Statue of Agostinho Neto 2012 Unknown 
Peace Monument 2009 1.5 
Antonio Agostinho Neto Cultural Centre 2009 40 
Cabinda Park 2008 13 
                                               
9 Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “DPRK reschedules Uganda’s debts,” January 15, 
1989.  
10 The East African, “Uganda, Tanzania in trouble with UN over ‘arms deals’ with North 
Korea,” April 12, 2014.  
11 Africa News, “Uganda; North Korea to Solve Police Housing Crisis,” 12 June 2013. 
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Benin Statue of King Béhanzin 2006 Unknown 
Botswana Monument to the Three Dikgosi 2005 1.7 
Burkina Faso Revolution Torch Square 1984 Unknown 
Chad Independence Square 2010 Unknown 
Congo (DR) 
Statue of Joseph Kasavubu 2010 Unknown 
Lumumba Monument 2002 10 
Basketball Stadium Unknown 14.4 
Athlete Academic Centre Unknown 4.8 
Statue of Laurent-Désiré Kabila 2002 Unknown 
Congo (R) Presidential Villa Unknown 0.8 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Government Office Building 2010 1.5 
Luba Football Stadium 2010 6.74 
Luba Governmental Conference Hall 2010 3.5 
Ethiopia Tiglachin Memorial 1984 Unknown 
Mali 
Statue of General Abdoulaye Soumaré 2012 Unknown 
Anonymous Soldier Monument, Army 
Square 2012 0.41 
Presidential Palace External Decoration 2010 0.7 
Mozambique Samora Machel Statue 2011 Unknown 
Namibia 
Presidential Palace 2008 49 
National Heroes’ Acre 2002 5.23 
Military Museum 2004 1.8 
Independence Memorial Museum 2014 10 
Senegal Monument de la Renaissance Africaine 2010 30 
Zimbabwe National Heroes’ Acre 1981 60 
 
Joshua Nkomo Statue 2010 Unknown 
Two statues of President Mugabe 2014 5 
Zimbabwe African National Union 
Patriotic Front Building Unknown Unknown 
* Because it is not possible to receive DPRK confirmation on these numbers, they should 
be considered as indicative only.  
 
Estimated Overall Value 
 
260.12 
 
III. Life as a Sanctioned State 
 
 a. Definitions 
 
 Economic sanctions, put simply, are the ‘deliberate, government-inspired 
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations’ 
(Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990, 2). If the conditions needed for sanctions to be 
successful tend to be for a state to be democratic, have good trade volume with the 
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sender, and some political instability that will be more likely to sway loyalty, it is 
easy to understand why sanction success rate is overall quite low. Indeed, Hufbauer et 
al. have placed a partial success rate at 34% out of 174 cases studied between 1915 
and 2000 (2009). American unilateral sanctions do not fare very well in this picture, 
with less than a quarter of economic blockades in the last four decades yielding 
satisfactory results (Rhyu and Bae 2010). We also know that institutional design is 
faulty in some cases, and especially when it comes to multilateralism: the United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions are binding according to United Nations 
Charter Article 25, yet the Security Council does not have the tools to legally make 
sure member-states follow and enact its decisions (Farrall 2009). What this means, is 
that many entities (i.e. business, private individuals, organizations) may be unaware 
of specific sanctions, and continue to engage with a targeted country because the state 
they legally operate in is either unable to enforce sanctions, or unwilling to do so. The 
question of will is also at the heart of the sanction dilemma: for sanctions to work, 
gains have to supersede the costs of abandoning a specific behavior or a specific 
relationship.  
 
 
 b. Application in light of the Korean case 
 
 The bulk of the North Korean sanction regime centers on a number of United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions that are intended to be ‘smart’ sanctions, that is 
to say sanctions that are designed not to harm the North Korean population that 
already suffers under harsh economic and human rights conditions. Thus, the 
sanctions are supposed to target the leadership (Weissmann and Hagström 2016). 
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Given that Pyongyang was affected by sanctions in three major areas (1) its nuclear 
development, (2) its military trade, and (3) its conventional trade, it is likely that 
DPRK-Africa relationships have been mostly affected within the military trade and 
conventional trade areas since it consists of the bulk of their relations. The most 
recent rounds of sanctions now target relationships and revenue-schemes that had 
largely been ignored in the past, but that the DPRK had sought in a bid to replace loss 
of revenues from its most visible relationships, notably with China (Haggard and 
Noland 2010). 
 
Overall DPRK military trade has been heavily affected since Security Council 
Resolution 1718 (October 2006) called for the DPRK to stop the development of its 
ballistic missile program.  A trade ban was put in place to block the sale of battle 
tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircrafts, 
helicopters, warships, missiles, missile systems, and large-scale arms. It was followed 
a few years later by Security Council Resolution 1874 (June 2009) that expanded the 
arms ban to all weapon imports and exports, with the exception, still, of small arms. It 
also became required for any state that intended to sell weapons to the DPRK to 
inform the United Nations Security Council beforehand. Sanctions further expanded 
to access possibilities, with Security Council Resolution 2087 (January 2013) 
allowing states to seize and destroy illicit cargo to and from the DPRK, as well as 
cargo that could contain materials used to research or develop weapons. Security 
Council Resolution 2270 (March 2016) fully prohibited small arms sales and light 
weapons trade. Finally, Security Council Resolution 2321 (November 2016) 
expanded the list of prohibited chemical, biological, nuclear and missile-usable items 
available for supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK.  
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As for the DPRK conventional trade, Security Council Resolution 1718 (October 
2006) installed a ban on luxury goods imports to North Korea, while emphasis was 
put on increased inspection of any DPRK-related cargo. Security Council Resolution 
1874 (June 2009) expanded sanctions on goods and prohibited loans to the DPRK, but 
still allowed humanitarian-purpose projects to be carried out. Yet, a few years later, 
Security Council Resolution 2087 (January 2013) expanded the ban on people 
traveling back and forth while Security Council Resolution 2094 (March 2013) 
restricted bulks cash transfer, and made it generally more difficult for the DPRK to 
access international banking systems. A number of additional bans on specific luxury 
goods such as jewelry, yachts, or conventional and racing cars were also enacted. 
Security Council Resolution 2270 (March 2016) called for the closing of any foreign 
financial institution, bank branch and joint venture in North Korea within three 
months and further sanctions were imposed on training and knowledge-exchange 
activities. Security Council Resolution 2321 (November 2016) compressed the 
DPRK’s economy even further by calling for a ban on the DPRK selling and 
transferring iron and iron ore and limiting the import of DPRK coal. It also prevented 
the DPRK from exporting a number of metals such as copper, nickel, silver, zinc, as 
well as specific manufactured goods such as helicopters, vessels, and statues. Security 
Council Resolution 2371 (August 2017) installed further limits on coal exports, iron 
and iron ore exports ore, seafood exports, lead and lead ore exports, as well as a 
freeze on the DPRK Foreign Trade Bank assets, and a ban on North Korean overseas 
laborers. Security Council Resolution 2375 (September 2017) imposed a ban on 
natural gas and North Korean-manufactured textile, imposed oil quota for sale to the 
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DPRK, imposed new restrictions on new visa for North Korean overseas laborers, 
called for systematic Korean ships inspections, and called for a ban on joint ventures. 
Finally, Security Council Resolution 2397 (December 2017) limited refined 
petroleum imports to the DPRK, and banned DPRK export of food, machinery, 
electrical equipment, earth, stones, woods, vessels, and industrial equipment. It also 
banned exports to the DPRK of industrial equipment, machinery, vehicles, and 
metals. It called for an asset freeze of the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, and 
called for inspections and impounding of vessels carrying petroleum products. 
Finally, it called for the return to of all North Korean overseas workers back to the 
DPRK within 2 years.  
 
 
 c. Hypotheses 
 
 For African countries, the sanction regime affecting their relationship with the 
DPRK is unusual, as United Nations sanctions are usually focused on peace and 
security, but in this particular case, focus on non-proliferation and on the destruction 
of trade links (Charron and Portela 2015). Sanctions imposed from 2016 onward are 
now directly relevant to the DPRK-Africa relationship, and are likely to change 
existing patterns of interactions that had been, until now, largely considered 
peripheral to the survival of the DPRK and the development of its missile and nuclear 
weapons program. To help frame the analysis in a rigorous and robust theoretical 
framework, the article focuses specifically on hypotheses that are underpinned by the 
concepts of balancing and bandwagoning behaviors which Stephen Walt identifies as 
contingent upon how a specific threat is perceived (1987). In Walt’s configuration, 
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states will generally attempt to balance against a specific threat, while weaker ones 
might bandwagon with the rising threat, depending on their strength, proximity, 
offensive capabilities and offensive intention. Adapting this model to the DPRK 
relationship context, states might see the DPRK’s actions and how they might 
eventually be in breach of sanction as threats. In this case, they will follow the 
UNSCR recommendation and attempt to apply and enact sanctions. They will 
therefore oftentimes sever the relationship they had with the DPRK (Balancing), if 
they had not already done so prior to the intensification of the sanction regime.  Other 
states might disregard the existing sanction regime and carry on with their 
relationship with the DPRK because of specific gains. Those perceived gains can lead 
to countries to not apply sanctions as a refusal to conform to an established, 
oftentimes Western-dominated economic environment (Defensive Bandwagoning). 
Other countries might refuse to conform to sanctions and start to engage with the 
DPRK because of perceived economic gains and an interest to fill the gap left by 
those who would have balanced (Opportunistic Bandwagoning). 
 
 
IV. Evaluating the post-sanction DPRK-Africa map 
 
 The majority of African countries have either past or shallow links with 
Pyongyang. While they were thus not directly affected by UNSCR sanctions, some 
were still mindful of their relations. Botswana for example did not have 
ambassadorial relations but utilized the Mansudae company for its Three Dikgosi 
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monument in 2005 before vocally severing its ties with Pyongyang12 over the UN 
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in 2014.13 Kenya started to develop ties 
with the DPRK in 2009, working mostly on low-level energy projects, but denied in 
2015 North Korea’s request for an embassy, managing its relation instead via the 
North Korean embassy present in neighbor Uganda. The rest of the relations can be 
divided into three categories:  
 
(a) Balancing, where states will change their behaviors and apply UN sanctions.  
Cases in this particular category mostly feature ship investigations, the severing of 
contract works with Mansudae Art Studio, and for a few deep-seated relationships, a 
drastic abandonment of military and economic trade links;  
 
(b) Defensive bandwagoning, involving countries that not only evade UN sanction 
application, but also generally take part in convoluted and disguised, illegal economic 
schemes to mask the relationship;  
 
(c) Opportunistic bandwagoning, where countries that did not necessarily have 
longstanding arrangements with the DPRK appear to be developing new ones amidst 
sanctions. This is particularly the case for the setting-up of new service-industry 
exchanges and goods trading.  
 
 
Figure 3. DPRK-Africa Post-Sanction Behaviors 
                                               
12 Botswana Daily News, “Botswana not Investigated for North Korea Sanctions Busting,” 
September 20, 2017.  
13 Tangerine, “Botswana Severs Ties with North Korea,” February 25, 2014.  
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a. Balancing – Switching to Apply Sanctions 
 
 One of the most visible and more accessible types of activity to sanction and 
monitor is shipping trade: for the DPRK, cargo ships have been used to bring 
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legitimate goods back and fro but in many cases, illegitimate goods have also been 
carried around in secret, dissimulated under food loads, for example. As a result, 
conventional trade is now severely restricted as they no longer just focus on military 
cargos. Thus, a number of countries have decided to refuse port usage to DPRK 
vessels. Comoros for example has removed North Korean ships from its registry,14 
while Sierra Leone has been investigating the case of vessels that might have been de-
registered from Panama to be flagged to Sierra Leone, thus breaching UNSCR 2321 
paragraph 24.15 
 
Mansudae’s arts and construction workers, another hard-to-hide business venture for 
the DPRK given the public nature of building erections, have been specifically 
targeted by the UNSCR 2397. For example, Mansudae customer Senegal had 
confirmed 29 active staff members in the country since the company’s registration in 
April 23, 2008. On October 13, 2016, however, Senegal stopped issuing entry and 
short stay visas to DPRK workers.16 Zimbabwe, which has enjoyed a close 
relationship with the Kim dynasty via Robert Mugabe has more recently cracked 
down on joint ventures with the DPRK and decided to apply UNSCR 2375.17 Given 
the range of activities that has involved both countries (those include Pyongyang 
training soldiers since 1980,18 a healthcare deal signed in 200619 and wild animals 
                                               
14 NK News, “Comoros Islands Removes Sanctioned N. Korean Ship from its Registry,” 
October 20, 2017. 
15 NK News, “Sierra Leone Says it is Investigating North Korea-Linked Ships,” March 7, 
2018.  
16 NK News, “North Korean Company under Investigation by Senegal: Dakar,” May 30, 
2017. 
17 Africa News, “Zimbabwe: Govt Buckles to UN Pressure on North Korea Dealings,” 
October 24, 2017.  
18 NK News, “Zimbabwe and North Korea: Uranium, Elephants and a Massacre,” October 30, 
2013.  
19 HIS Global Insight, “Pariahs Join Hands, as Zimbabwe and North Korea Sign Healthcare 
Deal,” August 11, 2006.  
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gifted to Pyongyang in 2010,)20 it is likely that Zimbabwe’s relationship with 
Mansudae will come into scrutiny, along with the investigation of small-scale 
businesses potentially linking individuals from the two countries.     
 
Three major DPRK partners have also started to cut ties with the DPRK. The United 
Nations started probing a North Korean firm called Green Pine Corporation in 2012, 
since it was located in Luanda.21 Given that the DPRK and Angola had, pre-sanctions, 
an extensive relationship involving agricultural investments and military 
engagements, 22 it is likely that the firm was trading beyond the remit still allowed by 
the sanction regime. Concrete actions to terminate the Mansudae Angola projects 
were taken on November 13, 2017, with Angola allegedly deporting a number of 
North Korean citizens later in the year. 23 Ethiopia, which had cultivated a relationship 
with the DPRK based on tight economic and political ties and wanted to boost its 
partnerships in 201724 responded to UNSCR 2321 by restricting access to bank 
accounts that were  available in its North Korean embassy and that were likely used to 
support underground and illegal activities in other parts of Africa as well. 25 Uganda 
appears to also be turning away, despite the extensive nature of the Uganda-North 
Korean ties: in the past, Uganda had received DPRK aid for its energy sector,26 North 
                                               
20 Africa News, “Zimbabwe: Govt Agency to Give North Korea Wild Animals,” May 17, 
2010.  
21 Africa Review, “UN Probes Angola and Mozambique Deals with North Korea,” September 
12, 2017.  
22 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, “Angola Ends North Korea Builder Contracts,” 
January 30, 2018.  
23 NK News, “Angola Terminates ‘all contracts’ with North Korea’s Mansudae Company: 
Report,” January 30, 2018.  
24 NK News, “North Korea, Ethiopia to Step up Bilateral Ties: KCNA,” June 9, 2017.  
25 NK News, “Ethiopia working to Restrict North Korean Embassy’s Bank Accounts: MFA,” 
August 3, 2017.  
26 Africa News, “Uganda; North Korea to Assist Energy Sector,” June 21, 2002.  
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Korea had built police housing, and it had trained police and military officers,27 but it 
could not escape the UN scrutiny. It appears that Uganda decided, as of late 2017, to 
expel North Korea military experts28 and has, according to a report submitted to UN, 
cut scientific, technical and military ties too. A number of entry permits have also 
been canceled for 9 doctors and 14 air force instructors. It is unclear if Uganda has 
expelled all illegal North Korean personnel, but with 2019 being the cutoff to expel, it 
might take a while to find positive proofs that the relationship has indeed been 
severed for the time being.29  
 
But while it is clear that halting a deep relationship has economic implications which 
are not insignificant for a number of African countries, decisions have been made 
based, at times, on external pressures. Sudan, whose attempts to buy ballistic missiles 
from the DPRK in 2008, 30 in clear violation of UNSCR 171831 were revealed in 2011 
by Wikileaks, was apparently pushed to reverse its ties with the DPRK as the United 
States offered to lift Sudan’s own economic embargo if it itself applied UN sanctions. 
32 Egypt, a country that has invested a large amount of capital to develop the DPRK’s 
mobile phone network, was also seeking to buy $23 million-worth of North Korean 
rocket-propelled grenades in 2016,33 before it allegedly decided to cut its ties with the 
DPRK because of direct American pressures.34  
                                               
27 Africa News, “Uganda; North Korea to Solve Police Housing Crisis,” June 12, 2013.  
28 Associated Press International, “Uganda Expels North Korea Military Experts over UN 
Sanction,” October 20, 2017.  
29 NK News, “Uganda Claims it is Curbing Ties with North Korea,” February 19, 2018.  
30 NK News, “Sudan Cuts Military Ties with North Korea,” November 2, 2016 
31 Sudan Tribune, “Wikileaks: Sudan Negotiating Purchase of Missiles from North Korea,” 
September 5, 2011.  
32 Sudan Tribune, “Lifting of Sudan’s Embargo Includes Commitment to Sanction on North 
Korea: Washington,” July 12, 2017.  
33 Daily Monitor, “Egypt Denies North Korea Rocket Propelled Grenades were Bought for its 
Military,” October 3, 2017.  
34 Arutz Sheva, “Report: Egypt cuts Ties with North Korea,” September 13, 2017.  
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For others, the fear that illegal activity nexuses and hubs might be uncovered, and 
which would lead to costly sanctions and retaliation from the international 
community, might have prompted change. Tanzania received North Korean 
maintenance assistance for their MiG fighters,35 and contracted North Korea to build 
an army museum. 36 They were however fooled by the DPRK when it opened 
traditional medical center Maibon Sukidor Medical that local authorities discovered 
was a sham as it offered dubious medical services and drugs.37 The transfer of nearly 
50 North Korean ships onto Tanzanian registration after UNSC 227038 appears 
suspiciously timely, however.  
 
 
b.  Defensive bandwagoning – Refusing to conform 
 
 
 A number of countries can however be labelled as serial violators, standing by 
their relations with the DPRK but more importantly standing by a number of illegal 
agreements and deals that they might not be able to find a cheap and accessible 
alternative for. Eritrea was, in 2017, in its third year as a UNSC violator. According to 
a United Nations panel monitoring, it was suggested the country attempted to 
purchase military communication equipment from Glocom, a North Korean front 
                                               
35 NK News, “Tanzania Won’t Deny N. Korea is Providing Military Assistance,” August 15, 
2013. 
36 BBC Monitoring Africa – Political, “North Korea to Assist in Building Army Museum in 
Tanzania,” August 31, 2008.  
37 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, “North Korea Opens Hospital in Tanzania – 
Media Report,” April 7, 2016.  
38 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, “Around 50 North Korea Ships Transfer to 
Tanzanian Nationality,” October 8, 2016.  
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company located in Malaysia. In this particular case, Eritrea is now under American 
sanctions that ban all equipment sales or interactions with its Navy. 39  
 
Mozambique was exposed as well by a UN Panel of Experts in 2017 as being in 
violation of missile shipments,40 with a further investigations pending and which 
focuses on the dealing of the Haegeumgang Trading Corporation, a North Korean 
entity that sold guns to a Mozambican firm called Monte Bingo.41 Further military 
training activities, as well as poaching and rhino horn trading with the DPRK,42 
sometimes using front companies and engaging into other illegal activities such as 
fishing were uncovered by a CNN investigation in 2018.43 Mozambique has also been 
involved in a number of joint ventures with the DPRK, which were formed in 2013 
and might have been dissolved by now. 44   
 
For Namibia who has engaged with the DPRK in a variety of sectors (commerce, 
transport, communication, defense, agriculture, energy, healthcare, education, 
environment45), cutting the DPRK out has been difficult, if not unwanted. North 
Korea built a munition factory in the Namibia Leopard Valley before the UNSC 
passed the 2004 sanctions. Mansudae was involved in 2002-2005 to build the factory, 
                                               
39 Africa Newswire, “US Imposes New Sanctions on Eritrea’s Navy over North Korea Links,” 
April 9, 2017 
40 UN PoE Finds N.Korea Continue to Sell Military, Sanctioned Items,” March 2, 2017.  
41 Africa Review, “UN Probes Angola and Mozambique Deals with North Korea,” September 
12, 2017.  
42 Daily Maverick, “Horns of a Dilemma – Mozambique Poaching Enriching North Korea’s 
Leadership,” July 13, 2016.  
43 CNN, “North Korea is Dodging Sanctions with Fish and Front Firms in Mozambique,” 
February 3, 2018. 
44 BBC Monitoring Africa – Political, “Mozambique Denies Violating UN Sanctions Against 
North Korea,” February 13, 2018.  
45 AFP, “Namibia, North Korea to Strengthen Economic Ties,” March 20, 2008.  
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46 and a further state house and a museum47 amounting to more than US$335 million, 
were contracted which Namibia claimed it had no knowledge about.48 Matters are also 
complicated by the fact that Mansudae has built Namibia’s new Defense Ministry 
headquarters. Reports in January 2017 suggesting Mansudae was now disguised as 
Chinese company shed light on the ambiguous and difficult nature of the 
relationship.49 Eventually, Namibia slowly started to submit required United Nations 
reports, and ultimately claimed compliancy in late November 2017.50  
 
 
c. Opportunistic bandwagoning- Should we worry? 
 
 Because a large number of African countries have decided to put a damper on 
their relationship with the DPRK, and despite the fact that a few countries will 
continue to engage with the DPRK, there might be a new window of opportunity for 
less scrupulous and more in-need countries.  Indeed, some might like to make quick 
money out of a number of illegal activities that used to be performed by other African 
countries, especially when it comes to sectors such as service provisions. Thus a 
number of countries such as Togo are willing to use their own tankers to transport 
petroleum or coal to the DPRK, regardless of sanctions.51 The Republic of Congo has 
started to set up medical professionals, equipment as well as training services from 
                                               
46 UPI, “North Korea Constructed a Munition Factory in Namibia,” March 16, 2016.  
47 Mail & Guardian, “Namibia violates UN Sanctions Against North Korea,” April 15, 2016. 
48 Africa Arguments, “Is it all over Between Namibia and North Korea?” July 13, 2016.  
49 NK News, “Not Going Anywhere: North Koreas Still Working in Namibia,” January 17, 
2017.  
50 Africa News, “Namibia: Govt Compliant on North Korea, Says Minister Nandi-Ndaitwah,” 
November 22, 2017.  
51 NK News, “U.S. Requests Blacklisting of Ten Ships for Transporting From N.Korea,” 
December 20, 2017. 
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2017 on, and for a period of 5 years.52  The DPRK has also offered energy 
cooperation and prospection know-how to Algeria,53 a country it has always 
maintained friendly relationship with since the DPRK sent support in 1958 to help 
them fight for their national liberation movement. Pyongyang has more recently 
offered to help Algeria with launching their own intelligence satellite, a move that 
would break a number of UNSCRs. 54 In early 2018, Niger, a country that does not 
have an official North Korean embassy, has reportedly engaged with the DPRK via its 
Nigerian ambassador to discuss new partnerships in the field of power, healthcare as 
well as infrastructure.55 Just as for Algeria, it is unclear how such cooperation could 
proceed given the extent of current sanctions.   
A few other countries such as Mauritania appear to have engaged with Pyongyang, 
with the DPRK Foreign Minister visiting several times in the past few years. Trade 
figures listed by Mauritania would amount to close to US$15 million, and would 
concentrate on chemicals, metal and vehicles, but are hard to verify as there might be 
reporting error attributing trade deals to the DPRK while they were actually 
conducted by South Korea. 56 The Gambia has also engaged with the DPRK since 
2014 to test out potential agricultural cooperation57 while Gabon, a country that has 
an established relationship with Pyongyang already albeit no dedicated embassy has 
                                               
52 NK News, “Congo Reveals Details of Health Protocol Signed with North Korea,” June 2, 
2017.  
53 Algeria Press Service, “Algeria, North Korea Examine Partnerships Relations in Energy,” 
April 27, 2017. 
54 Morocco World News, “North Korea Offers to Help Algeria Launch its Own Intelligence 
Satellite,” November 17, 2017 
55 Daily Independent (Nigeria), “Niger Govt to Partner North Korea on Power, Health, Other 
Projects,” January 31, 2018.  
56 NK News, “North Korean Delegation Visits Mauritania Amid Diplomatic Pressure,” May 
2, 2017. 
57 NK News, “In Angola, Potential for North Korean Investment in Agriculture,” July 23, 
2014; Tendersinfo, “Gambia: North Korea Presidium Head Ends Three Day Visit to The 
Gambia,” April 5, 2010.   
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reportedly signed a cultural cooperation agreement with the DPRK early 2017 and 
was also discussing public health provisions.58 A few counties show indication of a 
loose relationship with circumstantial evidence. This is the case for Guinea, a country 
with longstanding friendly ties linked to communist affinities in the 1970s and 1980s, 
sending students to the DPRK.59 Cameroon has also, in the past few years, indicated 
that it would aim to work more closely with the DPRK.60   
 
Finally, South Africa, Libya and Zimbabwe all have had rollercoaster relationships 
with the DPRK, and though they do not have close and formal ties anymore, some 
evidence might point to a renewal of potential closeness. In the case of South Africa, 
a number of North Korean diplomats were expelled in 2015 after they were found to 
be involved in forbidden rhinoceros horn trading.61 Yet, the DPRK still maintains an 
embassy in Pretoria, and allegedly purchased a number of exotic animals for its 
Pyongyang zoo.62 Yet, the relationship is often complicated by South Africa’s official 
stance on weapons of mass destruction, and its condemnation of the DPRK’s nuclear 
program. Zimbabwe has also maintained a very close relationship with the DPRK 
especially because of personal ties with former prime minister and president Robert 
Mugabe. The DPRK had trained solders in Zimbabwe since 1980,63 signed a 
                                               
58 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, “North Korea, Gabon sign Cultural Cooperation 
Agreement,” March 31, 2017; BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, “North Korea, Gabon 
Discuss Public Health,” March 30, 2010.  
59 NK News, “Being African in the Pure-blooded, Juche Republic,” March 13, 2013.  
60 Africa News, “Cameroon; Cameroon, North Korea Work for Closer Ties,” August 21, 
2013.  
61 Africa Review, “North Korea Diplomat Expelled from South Africa for Rhino Horn 
Trading,” December 24, 2015.  
62 NK News, “Where Does North Korea Buy Its Hyenas?” October 9, 2015.  
63 NK News, “Zimbabwe and North Korea: Uranium, Elephants and a Massacre,” October 30, 
2013.  
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healthcare cooperation deal in 200664 while the DPRK also received a number of 
animals gifted to the regime in 2010.65 With UNSCR2375, Zimbabwe’s joint ventures 
with the DPRK have been under scrutiny from the international community,66 and 
recent rapprochement between the DPRK and the ROK, as well as the potentially 
shifting nature of the relationship between the DPRK and the USA in 2018 and 2019 
mean that Zimbabwe could return to support trade with the DPRK more extensively 
in the future. Lastly, Libya has also engaged in talks on military cooperation in 2017, 
despite a checkered history that has seen the DPRK potentially supplying uranium to 
Libya, and extensive American and British pressure onto Gaddafi while he was still in 
power to cut ties with the DPRK.67 While any new talk of cooperation would more 
likely contravene sanctions, the current DPRK engagement via talk, as mentioned 
earlier, could pave the way for a renewal of more formal ties and activities.  
 
Conclusions 
 
 In 2018, the world has witness a sharp change of events on the Korean 
peninsula, with South Korean President Moon’s opening gambit at the Winter 
Olympics toward North Korea. Engagement patterns between the DPRK and the 
ROK, as well as between the DPRK and the USA have changed, and this is 
particularly interesting in light of the DPRK’s current situations when it comes to 
sanctions.  
                                               
64 HIS Global Insight, “Pariahs Join Hands, as Zimbabwe and North Korea Sign Healthcare 
Deal,” August 11, 2006.  
65 Africa News, “Zimbabwe: Govt Agency to Give North Korea Wild Animals,” May 17, 
2010.  
66 Africa News, “Zimbabwe: Govt Buckles to UN Pressure on North Korea Dealings,” 
October 24, 2017.  
67 NK News, “North Korea and Libya Discuss Military Cooperation Despite Sanctions,” 
February 10, 2017.  
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The purpose of this article was to consider the DPRK’s relationships with African 
countries in order to evaluate the impact of the current sanction might have had. The 
data clearly suggest that UNSCR sanctions have had an effect on dismantling some 
very long-lasting and deep relationships, such as Pyongyang’s relationships with 
Angola, Uganda or Tanzania, and this is due to UNSCR 2321, 2371, 2375 and 2397’s 
intense pressures on just about all areas of the DPRK’s conventional trading spheres.  
By using Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of thereat’ theory to consider three particular 
behaviors (balancing, defensive bandwagoning and opportunistic bandwagoning), the 
analysis also highlights a number of countries that have engaged with the DPRK quite 
recently on topics related to health and science, irrespective of the current sanction 
regime, and potentially in defiance of an established Western-led world order that 
dictate sanctions and appropriate behaviors.  
 
For the DPRK, removal of sanctions is crucial to achieve, and that nuclear diplomacy 
and bargaining with the United States could potentially lead to a scale down of the 
sanction regime. In case the DPRK’s display of good behavior, or its own negotiation 
skills are not enough to make the UN and the US cave, it is likely that a number of 
countries will continue to flirt with illegality when it comes to interacting with 
Pyongyang, and that North Korea itself will pursue covered trade deals in order to 
maintain foreign currency earning. There might be new alliances with countries that 
have not had much diplomatic engagement with the DPRK, and which raise eyebrows 
as to whether they are legitimate relations or outputs for the DPRK to engage in 
further illegal activities. Malawi will receive an ambassador that is based in 
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Zimbabwe,68 Gabon is discussing cultural and health cooperation with Pyongyang, 69 
Niger is developing new partnerships on power grids, healthcare and infrastructure 
via the Nigerian ambassador.70 Finally the new government structures in Libya might 
be interested in renewing a partnership with the DPRK on military grounds, thus 
breaking current sanctions from the get-go. This is true for the African continent, but 
should likewise be investigated in other parts of the world. 
 
There are also clear practical conclusions and implications coming out of this 
particular research: given the current state of affairs with renewed DPRK-ROK 
dialogue, and summit diplomacy taking place between Washington and Pyongyang, 
the question of sanction removal will have to be tackled in the near future if North 
Korea is sought to be making appropriate progress toward peace. Indeed, sanctioning 
the DPRK while it is attempting to develop its economy while being involved in a 
potentially solid dialogue on nuclear and military issues with the ROK and the United 
States might no longer be possible. While it is clear that scholarship focusing on the 
earlier days of the DPRK’s relationship with African countries highlighted political 
engagement and ideological quest, the DPRK now pursues relationships for its 
economic development  
Then, having a clearer understanding of the DPRK’s relations and foreign policy 
development as well as trade channels, beyond that of its relations with China for 
example, is crucial.  
 
                                               
68 Africa News, “Malawi: UK Endorses Malawi-North Korea Ties,” February 24, 2015.  
69 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, “North Korea, Gabon sign Cultural Cooperation 
Agreement,” March 31, 2017; BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, “North Korea, Gabon 
Discuss Public Health,” March 30, 2010.  
70 Daily Independent (Nigeria), “Niger Govt to Partner North Korea on Power, Health, Other 
Projects,” January 31, 2018.  
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